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I
INTRODUCTION
The question of where people should live has always been a source of ac-
tive differences of opinion. Why the question excites so much interest could
be a topic for investigation in itself. One explanation is that people identify
with a certain type of place (whether it be a small rural community or a large
city) based on childhood nostalgia or where a person strongly desired to live
at a point in his/her life. A person may feel unconsciously that policy should
favor that type of place. A practical reason for the lively interest is that the
geographical distribution of population influences the distribution of political
power. The existence of attitudinal and political overtones increases the need
for objective analysis.
The possibility of influencing where people live has risen in interest. Gov-
ernment policies to influence the distribution of population between different
regions, between rural and urban areas, between cities of various sizes, and
between central city and suburb have been proposed or implemented. Many
new policies of this type are under discussion. These policies involve complex
economic issues that have, for the most part, received only casual considera-
tion. The interest in policies to influence growth of particular parts of the
country shows every sign of continuing. To judge from study groups and task
forces, interest in population distribution policy is in fact mounting.
Recent studies are too far-flung to summarize here, but one dominant
theme in them is the disadvantages of big cities. Warranted or not, the follow-
ing ideas are expressed:
(1) Urban growth occurs at the cost of an increasingly inhospitable urban
environment. Air and water pollution, the noise level, and visual de-
spoliation have become part of the definition of urbanization. As cities
grow, more time and effort are required to gain access to work, con-
sumer outlets and recreational facilities, due to increasing distances be-
tween home and these destinations and to increasing road congestion.
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urban issues including pollution, congestion, property taxes, city services, welfare and employ-
ment policies in URBAN GROWTH POLICY IN A MARKET ECONOMY (1979). We thank Academic Press,
Inc. for permission to reprint portions of chapters 1, 2, 13, and 14.
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(2) The studies tend to accept the hypothesis that the urban psychosocial
environment deteriorates with increasing city size. High crime and de-
linquency rates, alienation and anomie are seen as characteristics of
large-city life. Ethnic and racial separation are believed to be more
pronounced in larger cities.
(3) The political environment of larger cities lacks adequate representation
for the inner-city poor and strong political institutions serving subur-
ban residents in matters of region-wide concern.
(4) The most rapid growth occurs on the outskirts of major metropolitan
areas and deprives central city residents of easy access to jobs in the
dynamic, growing, and usually higher-paying suburban employment
sector.
(5) Several studies see urban growth as sapping rural towns of vitality,
leaving poverty, unemployment and impoverished governments.
Researchers have recognized some general advantages of large scale eco-
nomic activity: a reduction in per capita costs of providing sewer, water, elec-
trical and other services where the per capita length of feeder lines is related
to population density; a broader range of goods and services available in retail
markets; and a more diverse array of employment opportunities. However,
these advantages are outweighed by the above itemized costs in the largest cit-
ies. The premise is that disadvantages are inevitable consequences of large,
highly concentrated population centers. Limiting growth is seen as a means
for preventing amplification of these conditions.
A. An Economist's Reaction
Many economists reject the idea of adopting explicit growth policies. They
favor letting the market accomplish the task (i.e., having no explicit policy).
Most discussions of regional and urban growth policies have been at an oppo-
site pole, ignoring the role of markets in achieving goals. Little serious con-
cern has focused on the question of what markets do and do not accomplish.
Only recently has the identification of market failure sources been recognized
as important in the analysis of urban size and growth policies. There has been
discussion of the possibilities that: (1) individuals impose uncompensated costs
or benefits on other individuals or firms (the magnitude of which are depend-
ent on city size); and (2) the social costs or benefits of migration are not fully
reflected in the private migration decision. If so, this would amount to a mar-
ket incentive for individual migration, leading to a population distribution
that is not optimal socially. The aggregate real national income could be in-
creased by having a different distribution.
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B. A Taxonomy of Tools
Many of the ills emphasized in policy discussions involve costs to individu-
als which are imposed unwittingly by the acts of others. Such private external-
ities have been of interest since Pigou.' Of more recent concern is the prob-
lem of institutional externalities in public financing, brought about by the
separation of overall benefits and cost considerations of government expendi-
ture and tax policies into several government institutions.
The recognition of externalities clarifies issues and organizes the dis-
cussion. Two types of policies emerge: (a) policies bearing directly on activities
which impose costs on others either by introduction of pricing measures or
through direct regulation, and (b) policies which affect the population distri-
bution between cities, as recommended in many study group reports. Table I
lists representative policies of each type. The optimal pricing schemes are rec-
ommended by economists, but have received less support in the public policy
process which tends to favor non-price externality policies and job and popu-
lation approaches.
The policies in Table I involving taxes on pollution, congestion, or mi-
gration have been neglected in public discussion, but are suggested by an
economic analysis of the role that such externalities play in causing the equi-
librium and optimal city sizes to differ. In the case of environmental
degradation, the tax per unit of air or water emissions would equal the value
of damage done by a marginal unit of emitted materials. For transportation,
the tax would apply to highway use, varying with the size and rate of highway
use at different times and locations.
Another possible tax approach would be geared to the externalities re-
sulting from adding a person to a metropolitan area. The tax would be
imposed on in-migrants or persons living in the negative externalities area.
Migration taxes or subsidies have been suggested previously by economists.
Attention has been given only recently to the fact that regional differences in
income tax rates, property tax rates, and welfare payments create incentives
to migrate. An example of this sort of policy, directed toward industry rather
than individuals, is the Economic Development Administration's (EDA) policy
of making low interest loans available for construction in depressed areas. On
the whole, however, systematic tax and subsidy schemes have been rejected
because of high administrative costs (including monitoring emissions and con-
gestion and collecting taxes or tolls) and the inability of current analytical
methods to determine what the optimal taxes or subsidies should be. Other
reasons, having to do with "equal treatment" and the attitude that regulation
and tax policies should remain separate, add to the difficulties of adopting
such policies. Apparently on the basis of objections such as these, study
1. A. Picou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
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TABLE I
POLICIES AFFECTING POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
Externality Policies
-optimal pricing of urban services and amenities
highway congestion taxes
pollution taxes
reform of property taxes and tf 1 pricing structure for local public services
industry and public sector taxes and subsidies related to external economies
of scale
- non-price policies
low-polluting fuel requirements
industry and vehicular emission standards
urban highway and mass transit construction
Policies Aimed at Population Movements
public works
subsidies for industry relocation
migration subsidies based on city size
individual taxes based on city size
accounting for distributional goals in federal expenditure policy
federal transportation subsidies
reform of interstate inequities in the welfare system
zoning to limit growth
planned urban developments
land banks
groups favor environmental policies involving direct regulation of producers
and households.
Many current public policies are having a major effect on the distribution
of population and on relative growth rates of cities and regions within the
United States. One implicit policy is the allocation of large defense contracts
which has stimulated firms to locate in the western and southern states for
several decades and has been a major factor in individual decisions to relocate
to these regions. No systematic apparatus exists for reviewing the implica-
tions of location decisions for federal facilities. Such a review would consider
their relative impacts on income and population distribution throughout the
country.
A second group of policies relates to the intra-urban tax structure. This
group is derived from economic studies showing that existing housing taxes
distort the population distribution. Reliance on property taxes to finance local
services gives high income residents an incentive to suburbanize, but excludes
low income residents who require services but cannot pay for them. The
urban personal property tax has been estimated to be equivalent to an excise
tax of over twenty-five percent on the value of housing services in some juris-
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dictions where it is applied.2 Rents collected by a landlord are subject to in-
come taxation, but house payments for owner-occupied dwellings are not.
New suburban housing (primarily single-family owned) appears less expensive
relative to new central city housing (primarily multi-family leased) than it
should considering the relative costs of the resources involved. The availability
of VA and FHA mortgage insurance for single-family dwellings reinforces
this. This discrepancy has been partially redressed in laws permitting condo-
minium ownership of apartments in multi-family buildings. Existing property
and income tax laws discourage investment in the construction and rehabilita-
tion of central city housing, while encouraging land-extensive, single-family
housing construction on the edges of metropolitan areas. This effect exacer-
bates the problems listed at the outset. Thus proposals for urban tax system
reform belong in a discussion of measures for dealing with the adverse conse-
quences of urban growth.
The remaining policies in Table I restrict development to existing areas,
thus restricting growth that would spread out and absorb the surrounding
countryside. Such policies have been suggested in "no growth" discussions and
land use instruments.'
Reviewing the policies listed in Table I, one notices that opportunities exist
for externality policies to deal directly with the ills of large urban centers.
However, the practical and administrative difficulties may rule out a far-
reaching program of policies needed to deal with the problems listed above.
For this reason, we must consider whether policies altering the distribution of
city sizes are justified. In Section II we consider the costs and benefits of such
policies, and operationalize these ideas for quantitative insights in Section III.
We bring together the analyses of the preceding Sections in Section IV.
II
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF POLICIES CONCERNED WITH
WHERE PEOPLE LIVE
A. City Size and Market Performance
If the market economy works efficiently, a geographic distribution of pop-
ulation will exist that is conducive to a maximum national income. Any policy
that changes the geographical distribution of people and jobs will result in a
loss to the nation. This is because, in the absence of externalities and monop-
oly, the well-known optimality of resource allocation through private markets
2. JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., IMPACT OF THE PROPERTY TAX: ITS
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN PROBLEMS 16-18 (Comm. Print 1968); D. NETZER, ECONOMICS
OF THE PROPERTY TAX 30-31 (1966).
3. See D. H. MEADOWS, D. L. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS & W. BEHRENS, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH
(1972). For critical assessments of the preceding source, see essays in THE ECONOMIC GROWTH
CONTROVERSY (A. Weintraub, E. Schwartz & J. R. Aronson eds. 1973).
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extends to questions of resource allocation over space. There can be a gain
only if markets are inefficient and if the policies succeed in reducing the inef-
ficiency. A logical consequence of these views is that the analysis of policies
influencing the geographic population distribution must consider the extent
to which markets do or do not give adequate gains and losses signals to influ-
ence free choices of where to live. Thus policy analysis seeks and quantifies
the effects of inadequate signals.
Considering this approach, we must explore the reasons for divergences
between social (total costs and benefits) and private costs and benefits
guiding market decisions. These externalities may be due to several causes.
They permit analysis of differences between the actual amount of activity that
occurs in an area and the amount which is optimum in the sense of con-
tributing most to the nation's income. The analysis ultimately leads to the pos-
sibility of estimating how different the optimum is from the actual amount of
activity observed and how great the gain would be from policies to rectify the
situation.
A foundation based on the relation of externalities to market outcomes is
needed for analyzing policies. The preceding Section identified two types of
policies: (1) policies that take externalities as given and attempt to influence
location of activity in light of the failure to completely internalize the exter-
nalities in market decisions; and (2) policies that frontally attack externalities.
Basic concepts for analyzing these two types of policies are developed in the
next two parts.
B. Optimal City Sizes Given Externalities
Figure 1 shows marginal products from employing non-location-fixed re-
sources in City A and in the rest of the economy. The distance between the
left and right vertical axes is the total amount of non-location-fixed resources
in the economy. Amount in City A is measured from the left, and in the rest
of the economy from the right. A consequence of pollution and congestion is
that "marginal social product with externalities" lies below "marginal private
product with externalities." If resources flow to equalize remuneration, the di-
vision of resources between City A and the rest of the economy will be at
point D where marginal private products are equal instead of at point E
where marginal social products are equal and where total production of the
economy would be maximized.
The marginal private and social product curves are determined by pro-
duction function considerations. Let the output of a producing unit be xi = xi
(ni, Si, Q), where the amount of non-location-fixed factors employed by the
producing unit is ni. Individual acts si of the producing unit contributing to
pollution and congestion also affect its output. Furthermore, producing units
output is affected by a totality Q which reflects pollution or congestion re-
sulting from all the individual acts. A relation Q = Q (s ... s,), which is a
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Marginal product
Marginal product in the rest
in City Aof the economy
Marginal products
without externalities
Marginal private product with externalities
ID
Marginal social product
with externalities
Employment in City A Employment in rest of economy
FIGURE 1 Marginal private and social products of population movements.
production function for Q, determines the total physical effect of the individ-
ual acts.
Pollutants may be emitted by firms during production activities or by
households and commuters. For example, housing-plus-access is a commodity
which families produce with their own time using purchased inputs (buildings
and automobiles). There is no need to distinguish here between outputs pro-
duced by firms or families, but both outputs must be included since chimneys
of factories and homes, and exhaust pipes of trucks and family automobiles
are all sources of pollution.
Pollutant emissions may be viewed as an input s in the production func-
tion for goods and services produced by polluters. Emitting of pollutants has
the essential input attribute that a change in amount of emission changes the
amount of product output that can be obtained from given amounts of all
other inputs. If a producer were reducing the emission of pollutants, he could
choose a combination of actions of substituting other inputs for emissions
(such as installing a precipitator or switching to cleaner, higher cost fuels) and
producing less output, which would be likely in view of high marginal costs.
Whatever the combination of actions, effects of a reduction in emitting can be
analyzed in the same way as would a reduction in a labor or capital input. In
the absence of incentives not to emit, pollutant emissions will tend to be
carried to the point where extra emission neither adds to nor subtracts from
the producer's output.
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Emitting of the pollutants has external effects through air quality. The ef-
fects are determined by the physical relation indicating how quality of the air
at large Q is influenced by individual acts of emitting. Air quality is an input
in production functions of firms and families affecting the output from a
given amount of other inputs through the dirt, discomfort and disease effects.
Some of the commodities affected by air quality are not traded in the market
place, involve family production, and are often discussed with the quality of
living (e.g., health). However, in general, air quality can be an input in the
production functions for traded or nontraded commodities which are pro-
duced either by firms or families.
When considering problems of air quality, input Q represents the air char-
acteristics in the environment that effect the production of commodities, while
input si represents the pollutant emissions caused by the production of com-
modities that effect the air characteristics of the environment. Unlike emitting
of pollutants, air quality is a Samuelsonian public good.4 A change in air qual-
ity ordinarily affects several parties to whom the quality cannot be individually
rationed. For much discussed reasons, there are impediments to reaching
group agreements among affected parties to change the amount of such a
good. In the absence of individual acts to change the quality of air, it is a
fixed input to the producing unit, and unlike a variable input, the air quality
therefore acts to shift the production function. Similar remarks apply to air
pollution. The input si causing congestion is putting a vehicle into traffic at a
particular time of day, which passes the same test for an input as emitting of
pollutants. If someone refrained from putting a vehicle into traffic at a partic-
ular time, he could make factor substitutions (using the greater inputs re-
quired to travel at different time of day, travel by another mode or produce
by means using less travel) and, in view of higher marginal costs, would be
likely to produce less output. Absent restrictions or charges on vehicles by
time of day, the producer has no incentive to make these adjustments.
As the number of vehicles operating on a given road capacity increases, a
point is reached at which further increases reduce the speed, Q, at which all
vehicles can travel. Changes in speed are thus analogous to changes in air
quality. The changes cannot be rationed individually to those whose speed is
affected and they act as a production function shifter.
In the absence of incentives to curb pollution and congestion, the increase
in output in City A may be less than the amount paid to resources added to
production because, accompanying the added output of the producing units
due to their use of the resources, there will be increased pollution and con-
gestion. Resources are valued according to the amount which the act of em-
ployment adds to the units' output given the existing position of their produc-
4. See P. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 387
(1954).
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tion functions, without taking into account the reduction in output due to
shifts in production functions caused by the added pollution and congestion.
Due to these external effects, the remuneration paid to resources both in
City A and in the rest of the economy will tend to exceed marginal contribu-
tion of the resources to output. If owners switch resources to make marginal
private products equal in City A in the rest of the economy, marginal social
products will be equal only if the excess of marginal private product over mar-
ginal social product is the same in City A as in the rest of the economy. The
nature of pollution and congestion is that as long as they are at low levels,
small increases will not shift production functions at all, but as levels are
raised, small increases will have increasingly severe effects; ultimately fumes
kill and traffic cannot move. Pollution and congestion increase negative exter-
nalities, the difference between marginal social product and marginal private
product becomes greater with higher levels of pollution and vehicles. Since
the levels tend to vary with city size, if resource owners adjust to make mar-
ginal private products equal, it is likely that the marginal social product of the
resources in a large city is below that in a small city. There would be an in-
crease in total product from switching resources to the smaller city.
In Figure 1, the increasing vertical difference between the marginal pri-
vate and social product curves with externalities, as employment in a place in-
creases, reflects the assumption that there are increasing negative externalities
due to pollution and congestion. The curves have been drawn assuming City
A is relatively large. Marginal product curves for the rest of the economy are
averages of marginal products from cities of various sizes, and therefore the
externalities for the rest of the economy are smaller than for C ity A. The as-
sumptions about negative externalities imply the point of maximum total
product at point E is to the left of the market solution at point D, showing
that with increasing negative externalities total product could be increased
through contraction of the large city.
1. Marginal Products and Monetary Wages
Details for a simple case are shown in Figure 2 to explain why the conclu-
sion is unaffected by labor's response to externalities. The first (upper) graph
is a benchmark, showing the situation without externalities. The topmost
curve is the hourly money wage divided by the price of traded goods, i.e., the
marginal physical product of labor in producing traded goods that would ex-
change for the bundle of nontravel local goods chosen by a person hired for
an extra hour. The dark line subtracts traded goods that would exchange for
travel expenses. At city size D' persons living on the margin are spending bD'
on travel. Travel expenses are smaller progressively down to zero as one con-
siders inner-city dwellers. Total travel expenses for the city is the triangular
shaped area abD'a. The residential rent premium due to proximity to the cen-
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ter is ad at the center, declining to zero at the margin. Thus rent-plus-travel
costs are the rectangular area abD'da for the city. At any city size smaller than
D', the distance to the margin is less, so that a lower rent-plus-travel cost rect-
angle would be drawn, with correspondingly lower travel expenses at the mar-
gin and lower rents for persons within the margin. The graph indicates the
role of changing land rents as a city becomes larger making the marginal cost
of travel-plus-rent the same for workers added as for those already in the city.
The dark line shows the amount of traded goods actually purchased because
all local products have been subtracted. In Figure 2 the market basket de-
manded is assumed to be unaffected by relative prices. Labor mobility creates
wages which enable buying the same amount of traded products, after buying
local products, in City A as in the rest of the economy. Thus equilibrium is at
point D'.
Wage in terms of
rtraded productsproduct Less spending on
a ._
d P
Employment in City A
Marginal (a)
product
Marginal private product, reflecting
congestion
a
Marginal social product,
reflecting congestion
Employment in City A - * , h
(b)
FIGURE 2 Marginal private and social products with congestion.
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In the second (lower) graph of Figure 2, the curve with intersection D' is
repeated, and the other curves show the effects of externalities due to traffic
congestion. A rent-plus-travel cost rectangle can be drawn, but for any given
city size it is larger than in the upper graph since congestion adds to travel
costs. Detail is exaggerated at the equilibrium point D. The amount of traded
products purchased by a worker is represented by a small rectangle of height
e above the x axis. The area afg shows the travel costs imposed by the addi-
tion of a worker at D due to increased congestion (i.e., it is the sum of shifts
in travel costs at all distances due to increased congestion). This is the exter-
nality which must be subtracted from the marginal private product curve
through D to arrive at marginal social product. Area aefgka is equal to efhje.
The curved line sloping down to the left and passing through E is the mar-
ginal social product showing such subtractions at every point from the curve
passing through D. The area efgke which is the extra travel cost imposed on
workers at the margin determines a downward deflection of the marginal pri-
vate product curve due to congestion (i.e. determines the extent to which the
curve passing through D lies below the curve through D'). This downward
deflection is only part of the marginal externality, the rest of the externality
involves increases in travel costs for workers not at the margin. Since the ex-
ternal costs are subtracted from whatever private costs exist at the margin, the
marginal social product curve passing through E must lie below the marginal
private product curve passing through D. While the externality leads to a re-
duction of city size from D' to D, there is still a marginal externality at D. If,
after labor has moved to equalize real wages, city sizes still differ as expected
due to differences in production possibilities among localities, there will still
be differences in externalities among cities. If City A remains larger than av-
erage, the point E still lies to the left of D.
The conclusion holds in the more general case illustrated in Figure 3
where (a) market basket chosen is affected by relative prices, (b) externalities
are due to traffic, pollution or other causes, and (c) externalities may affect
location-fixed as well as non-location-fixed factors through raising production
costs of both local and traded products. The two sets of dark lines in Figure 3
correspond to the lines in Figure 1. Figure 3 indicates the general case of the
relation of the marginal private and social product curves to money wages
and market basket considerations.
The topmost curve in Figure 3 shows how many traded products could be
purchased with the money wage. The next curve, traded products actually
purchaged, depends on the varying ratio k of local to traded products cho-
sen. The cost of one unit of a variable weight composite commodity, each unit
of which contains a unit of traded products and the associated local products
chosen, is PT + kpL. The amount of this commodity purchasable from an
hour's employment is the wage divided by this cost per unit w/(pT + kpL). In
the denominator substituting k = X,/XT, factoring out 1/XT, substituting w for
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Wage in terms of
traded products
Traded products PL XL/PT
purchasedf' xp
Marginal p'LX'L/P'T<
private productMarginal .t
social product
"JJ XT(
FIGURE 3 Marginal private and social products in the general case.
PTXT + PLXL and cancelling with the w in the numerator reveals that w/(pT +
kpL) is equal to the amount of traded products purchased XT.
In the earlier consideration of market baskets, we showed that the mar-
ginal private product of employment in City A is w(l + o,)/(pT + kpL), where
k is a fixed ratio defining an arbitrary composite commodity and 0" is the per-
centage wage adjustment that would make the satisfaction from the arbitrary
composite commodity equal to satisfaction from the bundle of products actu-
ally chosen. If the market basket chosen was unvarying and used to define the
composite commodity, a" would be zero and k would equal k. A less complex
case would exist where the curves for traded products purchased and the
marginal private product coincide.
To obtain the marginal social product, subtract the money value of exter-
nality v from the money wage, and express the resulting amount of composite
commodity purchasable, adjusting for the satisfaction from choosing a more
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desired bundle than in the composite commodity. This gives (w - v)(1 +
oj/pT + kpL) which is the lowest curve in Figure 3.
The exact relationships between money wages, traded products purchased
and marginal private and social products in the less complex case of Figure 2
are seen only as tendencies in Figure 3. In the less complex case the higher
price of local products makes money wages higher in the larger city. If exter-
nalities raise the costs of local products, there may be a tendency for money
wages to be higher the greater is the externality. However, the relation is not
exact since externalities can impinge on location-fixed factors and can raise
costs of producing traded products, neither of which need affect the money
wages necessary to attract labor. Externalities lower marginal private product
because they raise the cost of local products as in the case of Figure 2 and be-
cause, in the more general case, they may raise the costs of producing traded
products. The effect of externalities in lowering marginal private product re-
duces city size, but externalities remain for any given city size. Thus, the argu-
ment that existing large cities tend to be too large is unaffected. This frame-
work suggests that externalities proide a basis for evaluating policies that
affect the distribution of activity among cities.
C. Reducing Externalities for a Given City Size
1. Optimum Theoretical Price
A frontal attack on externalities attempts to put a tax or price on the activ-
ities of producing units which shift production functions of other producers.
A tax or price on an externality causing activity si, exactly equal to marginal
effect of the activity on outputs through shifter Q, is called an optimal tax.
As taxes are raised from zero toward their optimal values, the marginal
private product curve shifts upward. The decline in externality-causing activ-
ity has the effect of reducing marginal costs of producing traded and non-
traded commodities. A manifestation of the gain from reducing the external-
ity is likely to be that the production function shift (effect on Q due to smaller
si's in response to the tax) lowering costs, is greater than the effect of the tax
as a cost raising item. The marginal social pro duct curve is shifted closer to
the marginal private product curve since the higher tax on externality-causing
activities reduces the divergence between marginal private and social costs.
When the optimum tax is reached, the marginal social and private product
curves coincide, as noted by the curves in the upper graph of Figure 1.
If pollution is not industrial, the City A curves should shift up more than
for the rest of the economy. This hypothesis rests on the supposition that the
main determinant of an upward shift is the magnitude of externality which is
being reduced by imposing the tax. Since the externality is greater in City A
than the rest of the economy, the potentiality for upward shift is greater. This
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hypothesis implies that City A will become larger as taxes on externality-
causing activities are increased. At the distribution of resources between cities
existing when taxes are raised, the marginal private product of resources, be-
ing raised further in City A than in the rest of the economy, will induce a
movement to City A indicating that the new equilibrium must lie to the right.
Thus the equilibrium point F where taxes are high enough to eliminate ex-
ternalities is at a larger size of City A than equilibrium with externalities at
point D.
As discussed above, externalities are usually connected with increasing city
size and raise the costs of nontraded goods because of traffic congestion and
air pollution resulting from coal burning for household heat and exhaust
from automobiles. Instituting a charge for causing pollution would have a di-
rect impact in raising costs of producing housing-plus-access and other non-
exported commodities, but the lowering of production costs for goods due to
production function shifts can be expected to exceed the levied charges. Ben-
eficiaries of the increased output due to the pollution charge consist of the
group paying the pollution charges. With the fall in the nontraded goods
price, the money wage necessary to attract labor to the city is lowered,
inducing more firms producing traded goods to locate in the city. On the
other hand, as discussed below, it is possible that taxing pollution from ex-
ported commodites would reduce city size.
2. Algebraic Representation
Let the production functions in City A be XT = xT(NT, ST, Q) for traded
goods and XL = xL(NL, SL, Q) for nontraded goods, where NT and NL are
amounts of non-location-fixed resources, ST and SL are the externality
producing activities, and Q = Q(ST, SL) is the shifter affected by these activi-
ties. The equilibrium condition for use of non-location-fixed factors is that
marginal revenue must be equal to marginal cost: PTXTN = w and pLXLN = w,
where the second subscript refers to the derivative with respect to that vari-
able. A tax on externality causing activities is a marginal cost of engaging in
them and results in similar equilibrium conditions: prXTs = vTT and pLXLs =
7TL, where the 7T's are the firm or household taxes on the activity.
Let N be the total amount of non-location-fixed resources in City A (N =
NT + NL). Substitute dQ/dN obtained from the expression of Q into the de-
rivatives of the production functions with respect to N, and use the equilib-
rium conditions to substitute prices for partials (e.g., XTN = W/PT). Insert-
ing the resulting expressions for dxT/dN and dxL/dN into the expression for
the change in the value of output from employing an extra unit of non-loca-
tion-fixed resources, pT(dXT/dN) + pL(dXL/dN), gives change in value w +
7TT(dST/dN) + 7TL(dSL/dN) + (pTxTQ + pLXLQ)[QT(dST/dR) + QL(dSL/dN)], which
in terms of Figure 3 is w - v.
With no attempt to control externalities 7TT and iTL are zero. To find 7TT,
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the rT that maximizes output, obtain expressions for dxT/dST and dxL/dST by
the same steps as for dxT/dN and dxn/dN except that differentiation is with
respect to ST, and insert them into the maximizing condition
pT(dxT/dST) + pL(dxt/dST) = 0.
Rearrangement of the result gives:
7TT = -QT(PTXTQ + pLXLQ).
Similarly
rTL = - QL(PTXTQ + pLXLQ).
QT and QL are changes in amount of public good, and PTXTQ + PLXLQ is the
effect of a change in the public good on value of output. If 7TT and 7r1 are in-
serted into the expression in the preceding paragraph for the value of output
from employing an extra unit of non-location-fixed resources, the value re-
duces to w (i.e., private and social product coincide). The conditions 77T = 7TT
and ITL = 7TL underlie the marginal product curves in the upper graph of Fig-
ure 1.
The effects on city size of varying taxes between zero and values which
maximize output may be examined by assuming that Q = Q(ST, SL) take the
form Q = ST + SL, with 7T = 7TT = 7TL. Increasing the tax 7T in City A and 7r'
in the rest of the economy shifts the marginal private product curves. By
comparing the shifts, one can deduce whether the intersection resulting from
a raise in the two tax rates will be moved to the right or left (i.e., to larger
or smaller size of City A). Eliminate prices and wage from marginal product
w(1 + u)I(PT + kpL) by using the equilibrium conditions, w/PT = XTN, and dif-
ferentiate with respect to i-. Rearranging and dividing by marginal private
product gives the percentage change in marginal private product resulting
from a change in 7T:
[pT/XTN(pT + kpL)] [XTNN(dNT/dir) + XTNS(dST/dT) + XTN(dQ/drr)]
+ [kpL/XLN(PT + kpL)] [XLNN(dNL/dr) + XLN(dS/dir) + xLNQ(dQ/dTr)].
To obtain vertical shifts, the differentiation indicated in this expression is
carried out holding N constant, which implies dNT/dr + dNL/d~r = 0. If the
ratio of consumption of traded to nontraded commodities remains stable and
if production coefficients are unaltered, NT or. NL will not change. While these
conditions are unlikely to be fulfilled exactly, they suggest that dNT/dT and
dNL/dr are small. The effects of an increase in externality causing activity on
the marginal productivity of labor, XTNs and XLNS, are likely to be positive
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while dST/dwr and dSL/drr are negative (rise in tax causes reduction in the
activity) making the terms containing these derivatives negative. The main rea-
son for gain from a tax on externality causing activities appears to be that
the positive dQ/drr terms, giving increments to production from reducing the
externality causing activity are greater than the negative terms containing
dsT/drr and dSL/dlr.
An example of externalities emanating from local goods (large dSL/dr),
such as automotive pollution and congestion caused by city residents com-
muting, taxing the externalities would cause a city to have cleaner air and
lower rent gradients, and monetary wages would be lower relative to those in
smaller cities. More manufacturers of labor-intensive transportable goods
would locate in big cities rather than in places where lower wages are present.
The city would become larger.
As an example of externalities from export production (large dST/d7r), a
pulp mill producing traded goods if required to pay a charge for pollution
might be forced out of business in a given locality. While the improved envi-
ronment would lower the wage necessary to keep labor in the area, the new
industry attracted by the lower wages might not result in as much employ-
ment as the pulp mill.
3. Pricing in Practice
Even if city size is reduced, unless externalities impinge one city to an-
other, the gains from eliminating externalities accrue within the city where
they occur, and so there should be local incentives, e.g., through city govern-
ment, to take action against them. If eliminating externalities would be in the
city's as well as the nation's interest, the question arises: Why do city residents
not take action accordingly. Lack of public awareness does not explain the in-
action, since the adverse effects of pollution and congestion receive substantial
publicity. Among several reasons are conflicts of interest within a city and re-
sistance to paying for things for which no charge has been traditionally made.
Other impediments result from difficulties in charge systems including costs
of collection and lack of knowledge of what the charges should be.
The impediments suggest that while there may be further progress in
internalizing externalities, complete internalization is unlikely. If so, there
could be a role for both of the major policy directions, namely, taking account
of externality differences in public decisions affecting the allocation of re-
sources among cities, and finding ways to internalize externalities within a
city.
III
COMPARING COSTS AND GAINS OF CITY GROWTH
The preceding analysis indicates that if externalities are not fully
internalized, city sizes will not be carried to the point where marginal benefits
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equal marginal costs. Some cities may be too big, others too small. The nu-
merous policies discussed in the introduction propose, in one way or another,
to alter the city sizes that would prevail in an unfettered market solution. This
Section utilizes the ideas developed above to gain quantitative insights into
such policies.
We will postulate a policy that will have a given effect on city size. The ex-
ample is a growth retarding policy. Growth retardation implies sacrificing pri-
vately perceived gains. These gains are reflected in willingness to bear the
costs of greater daily travel mileage as a city grows. In addition to the pri-
vately perceived gains, one must consider external gains or costs of the
growth that are unaccounted for in private decision. Density changes are used
as an example of external effects. We will demonstrate how order of magni-
tude estimates can be developed for comparing costs and gains of policies af-
fecting city size. The concern is with development of a methodology to ana-
lyze policies, rather than with evaluation with particular policies per se.
A. Private and Social Benefits and Costs
The total income change resulting from altering the location of activity is
the sum of the increases in income for areas where economic activity is
greater minus the sum of the income decreases for areas where economic ac-
tivity is diminished. The "invisible hand" assumption is that individual actions
are carried to the point where extra gains just equal extra costs. If this as-
sumption were fulfilled, the output of each city would be carried to the point
where the cost of additional units of output was equal to the value of addi-
tional output. The market economy would achieve the spatial distribution of
activities making the greatest contribution to national income. Any policy al-
tering this distribution would have the net effect of decreasing national in-
come. For cities reduced in size by a policy, output would be diminished by
more than costs. For cities whose size was augmented, output would be raised
by less than their increase in costs.
If the invisible hand assumptions were fulfilled, the upper and lower parts
of Figure 4 would contain only one curve. In the upper part of Figure 4, for
a city reduced in size from A to C, each unit of reduction in output would re-
duce output by a dollar, implying output movement along the horizontal line
AC. Cost reductions would consist entirely of reductions in private costs which
would be reduced progressively moving along the marginal cost AB curve.
The excess of the output reduction over the cost reduction would be the area
ABC. By similar reasoning in the lower graph, for a city increased in size
from F to H the excess of the cost increase over output increase would be the
area FGH. The decrease in national income from a policy affecting the distri-
bution of activity would be the sum of the ABC areas for cities reduced in size
plus the sum of the EFG areas for cities increased in size.
There are many reasons why the "invisible hand" assumption is not ful-
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filled. In the upper graph of Figure 4, a situation exists where costs are
imposed on others. The costs are unperceived largely by the individuals and
firms causing them and are not accounted for in their activities. Pollution and
congestion are examples of these largely unperceived external costs imposed
on others when there is additional output in a large city. In Figure 4, the ex-
ternal cost imposed on others from an additional dollar of output in the city
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is AE. Instead of a net cost existing to reduce the size of the city from A to C,
there is a net gain. The output reduction given before as movement along the
horizontal line AC, whereas the cost reduction is given now by movement
along the higher curve ED. The net gain from the reduction in city size is the
difference between the private cost area ABC and the external gain area
ABDE, or the shaded area ACDE.
The policy effect for the city in question can be estimated as the net sum
of the two parts noted. With regard to external costs ABDE, the change in
city size is unlikely to greatly affect marginal external costs AE for most realis-
tic policies, since policies cannot be expected realistically to change sizes of
large cities by more than a few percent.-The change in external costs can thus
be estimated as marginal external cost AE times change in output AC. The
other part of the policy effect, which is the excess of the change in output
over the change in private costs, is area ABC considered previously. The ef-
fect on income ACDE from changing the size of the city is change in external
costs ABDE minus the excess of change in output over change in private costs
ABC. Estimating the area ABC requires quantifying how private costs vary
with level of activity. Estimating the area ABDE requires quantifying external-
ities.
The lower graph of Figure 4 depicts a situation where there are external
economies making costs lower than privately perceived costs. Economies of
scale are cited frequently as a phenomenon associated with city size. The
economies can be internal or external. An example of an external economy is
the effect of an increase in city size increasing density and thereby reducing
costs of delivery and pickup. Pupil transportation and waste collection services
are two examples of functions whose cost is reduced by an increase in density.
Economies due to density are external or unperceived in private decisions.
Bids for land, which determine density, reflect only private gains and costs of
people who take as given the conditions facing them in the city. The reduc-
tion in costs of travel by other individuals, firms or government entities due
to greater density does not affect the calculation influencing the individual's
decision. Density shifts the production function and has the technical attri-
butes of a public good. A problem encountered with density and all public
goods is that the full gains from having such goods are not reflected in indi-
vidual market decisions in the absence of government or other outside
arrangements. Density is one of several reasons for external economies of
scale encountered at city growth stages. In the lower part of Figure 4, the
gain from increasing city size from F to H is FHJK, estimable as external
economy FGJK less excess of additions to private costs over additions to out-
put FGH.
Hopefully, a population distribution will reduce city sizes for which there
is a gain from city size reduction and will increase city sizes for which there is
a gain from expansion. These situations are depicted in Figure 4. However,
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the gains could be negative if the relation between private and social costs
were reversed. In the upper graph of the figure, the social cost curve might
lie below the private cost curve, and in the lower graph, social cost might be
above private cost. For unemployment effects and for institutional or public
finance effects, the relation between social and private cost might vary geo-
graphically by region, but not necessarily in a systematic way by city size.
These effects might make social costs greater, or less than, private costs.
B. Distance to Work
The estimated effects of population distribution policy subdivides into a
concern with: (1) external effects and (2) changes in private or direct costs
from changing the amount of economic activity in an area. Among the rea-
sons for changes in private costs is commuting and related daily travel. These
costs are small in small towns, and they increase with larger city sizes. The rise
in daily travel costs is one of the limiting considerations determining city size.
The cost advantages from having some kinds of production in a large city are
sufficient to compensate for large daily travel costs, but the costs rise due to
daily travel eventually raises the cost of additional output in the city relative to
that in smaller cities. Daily travel costs appear to be the main reason why most
of the nation's economic activity is not located in one huge city.
Complaints of residents of cities and general indignation over environmen-
tal conditions in larger cities have given impetus to recommendations that at-
tempts be made to foster a growth pattern away from larger cities. The rec-
ommendations could be justified on national income grounds if the reduction
in external environmental costs more than offsets the loss due to the greater
reduction in output than in private costs, that is, if ABDE exceeds ABC in
Figure 4. When city size is reduced, or when a city is kept from growing as
much as it otherwise would, it is kept away from equilibrium point A. As re-
flected in market costs of resources indicating their opportunity returns, the
labor and capital resources excluded from the city are producing less private
returns elsewhere than if they were admitted to the city.
Suppose that the growth of a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA)
of 6 million persons is stopped for a decade, during which time its population
would otherwise grow by 10 percent. In Figure 4, the city is kept at C instead
of being allowed to go to point A. If daily travel were the only reason for up-
ward slope of the marginal cost curve, an estimate of the effects on the travel
would enable estimation of the area ABC.
The number of persons living in a ring of width dr located r miles from
the central business district is the area of the ring 27rr dr times the population
density of the ring D. In this example, the distances at issue are on the
fringes of a large city where typical suburban densities may be expected to
prevail, suggesting a reasonable assumption is a value of Dm of about 1,000
people per square mile. Let c be travel cost per mile, which will be assumed
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here to be 100 per mile. Let r be the daily travel per person to the central
business district and to other destinations unaffected by where the family
lives, expressed as the number of round trips that could be taken to the cen-
tral business district if the travel mileage were for such trips only. If the pop-
ulation consisted of four person households, and if the only effect on travel
of living further away from the central business district were to increase the
commuting trip of the head of the household to the central business district, T
would be 1/4 (one out of every four people making one standard trip each
day). A consideration decreasing r is that not all work trips are to the central
business district. The fact that many shopping trips and goods deliveries in-
volve that travel destination increases T. Bearing in mind that r is for travel
from the outlying points of the city where growth takes place, refined esti-
mates of T could be made from travel surveys. In this example, it is assumed
that T does not change over the range of city growth being considered. This
assumption is probably defensible for the assumed growth range of only 10
percent. For a higher percentage rate of growth, particularly if one were con-
sidering smaller city growth, T would be expected to decline as distance from
the central business district increased. This effect could be allowed for by ex-
pressing 7 = T(r). The modifications of the formulas below are obvious and
could be handled in exact numerical analysis.
The extra mileage of travel from the edge of the city to the city center
versus travel from a ring at distance r from the city center to the city center is
m = r multiplied by 2 to account for a roundtrip, or 2m = 2r. Let m, refer to
the distance to the edge of the city that would prevail if the city reached pri-
vate equilibrium. The city size corresponding to m, is at point A in Figure 4.
The mileage 2m, - 2r is extra travel that would be worthwhile to undertake
from closer distances r, while still covering the costs of output produced by
persons living at r. For distances to which the city is not allowed to grow, the
cost of travelling 2m, - 2r miles is a measure of the net gain foregone from
not having people live at distance r. The sum of extra costs from the actual
margin mo,, to which the city is constrained by a population distribution policy,
up to the private equilibrium margin m, is the cost ABC in Figure 1. The
cost is then the integral from no to m, of the extra mileage (2m 1 - 2r) times
cost per mile c times number of standard trips per person - times population
at that distance Dm27rr dr. Assuming 250 work days per year, the yearly cost
is obtained by multiplying by 250 to obtain:
1000 7rcT Dm f"(m, - r) r dr
which equals:
1000 IrCT Dm [m, (m 2 -m 2) /2 - (M' 3 - m 3) /3].
Suppose the edge io to which the city is constrained is 25 miles from the
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central business district. Under the assumption that additional growth would
take place at suburban density of 1000 persons per square mile in a circular
expansion, the area required for a population growth of 600,000 would be
such that the added area times the density would equal the added population.
This condition is (7rml2 - 7rrno) 1000 = 600,000, or m, = (600/7r + rn0o) 12 .
Given a value of ino of 25, the solution for m1 is 28 miles.
All the needed values have now been given. Inserting the values into the
foregoing centered expression indicates as the area ABC a yearly loss of $43
million, due to the movements along private costs curves if growth of the city
is restricted by 10 percent.
C. Density
As indicated above, analyzing city scale effects requires giving attention to
slope of the privately perceived cost curve that determines the area ABC.
Nevertheless, most of the analysis of effects of population redistribution in-
volves the external or unperceived costs that make a difference between
height of private and social curves and determine the area ABDE. External or
unperceived costs is the concern of this subsection.
As pointed out at the beginning of this Section, one reason for the differ-
ence between private and social costs is the effect of city growth on density.
As small towns become larger, the average density must rise as the increasing
distance to work makes residential land near work places more valuable,
thereby inducing the construction of denser housing including multi-family
structures. Whether average density continues to increase indefinitely is moot.
For an existing large city, new growth on the city's edge will be at a suburban
density which is exceeded in increasing magnitude by the higher densities
prevailing nearer the center. Only if the further increase in density nearer the
center induced by city growth overcomes the decrease due to the lowering ef-
fect on average density of the growth at the edge, will average density of the
city increase. Buildings in place which would have to be torn down to increase
density will impede the density response. The possibility of development of
new subcenters within the city, instead of continuing to increase the densities
in proximity to existing centers and subcenters, could further retard average
density response. For these reasons, one at the least expects an eventual
slowing in the increase in average density as a city grows, and conceivably
there could be a fall.
For a city with a single center, the average density is determined by a den-
sity gradient beginning at the suburban density at the edge of the city and ris-
ing continuously up to maximum density at the center. If the city is not too
large, density may rise by a constant exponential amount over the entire
range:
Dr = Dmekr
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where Dm is density at the edge, m is the size of the city measured as the dis-
tance between the edge and the center, r is the distance from the edge going
toward the center of the city and Dr is density measured as persons per
square mile at the distance r. If the city is circular, the population in a dough-
nut shaped ring is D, 2lrr dr or substituting out the expression for Dr just
given, Dmdkr 27rr dr. Summing over all the rings between the margin and the
center, the total population N of the city is N = ofm 27rDmekr rdr. Carrying
out the integration gives:
N = 21rDm (ekm - 1 - km)/k 2
Dividing the population N by the city area A gives the average density of
the city 15, or 15 = N/A. To find out how average density is affected by city
growth, differentiate 6 with respect to N and multiply by N/15 to obtain the
percentage change in average density resulting from a one percent increase in
population, (d5/dN)(N/D) = 1 - (dA/dN)(N/A) which is the percentage in-
crease one in population minus the percentage change in city area. The prob-
lem reduces to finding the effect of population growth on city area. Again as-
suming the city is circular, its area A is 27rm 2 . Differentiating the area with
respect to m and then multiplying by N/A reveals that the percentage increase
in area resulting from a one percent increase in population, (dA/dN)(N/A), is
2(dm/dN)(N/m). Substituting this result into the equation for (dD5/dN)(N/D),
the percentage change in average density is:
(dD/dN)(N/D) = 1 - 2 (dm/dN)(N/m)
To find the percentage increase in the distance m between the margin and
the center as a result of the one percent increase in population, take the dif-
ferential of the equation for population, N = .27rDm(ekm - 1 - km/k2 ), letting
N and m vary. The result is dN = (27rDm/k)(ekm - 1)dm. Solving for dm/dN
and multiplying by N/m gives (dm/dN)(N/m) = [1/kn] - [1/(ekm - 1)] which in-
serted into the foregoing centered expression reveals the percentage change
in average density resulting from a one percent change in population to be:
(dD5/dN)(N/D) = I - 2{[1/km] - [1/(em - 1)]}.
Because of the possibility that the assumed shape of the density function is
not suitable for predicting effects of growth of a very large city, a numerical
example will be given for a city of one million persons. In the formula for
population N = 2ITDm(e k m - 1 - km)/k2 , a population of about one million
will be obtained by assuming a suburban density Dm of 1000 persons per
square mile, increase in density per mile k going toward the center of .2 and
distance m from margin to center of about 10 miles. Applying the value of
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km of 2 in the expression just given for (dID/dN)(N/D) indicates that the elas-
ticity, or percentage change in density resulting from a one percent change in
population, is .3.
The next task is to find the effect of change in density on costs. While
density is often found to be significant in studies of local government expen-
ditures, systematic investigation of effects of density on costs has not been
undertaken. For purposes of a numerical example, a reasonable value of the
elasticity of costs with respect to density is - .1. This is not an exact estimate,
but a judgment based on University of Chicago studies of waste collection
costs and of education expenditures and on a review of other studies. 5
Combining the foregoing results, the elasticity of percentage change in
costs resulting from a one percent increase in population, due to effects on den-
sity, is the elasticity of costs with respect to density times the elasticity of den-
sity with respect to population, i.e., -. 1 times .3, or -. 03. The costs affected
include all production involving significant daily travel in the city such as
commuting, business pickup and delivery, and a variety of local government
services. For purposes of the example, suppose that one-third of the income
produced in the city is subject to cost reduction. Then the elasticity of total
costs, including both the commodities affected and those not affected, is one
third of -. 03, or -. 01. If the total income produced in the city is $2.5 billion,
the effect on production costs of growth of the city population by 10 percent,
or one-tenth, is one-tenth times -. 01 times $2.5 billion or a cost savings of
$2.5 million for a city of one million (in Section IV, conclusions and policy
implications illustrate a city of 6 million, about the size of Chicago or Los An-
geles).
Density has been used in this Section as an example of an external effect,
in connection with which it has been postulated that the growth of a smaller
city will have gains. Policy conclusions, if any were to be drawn, would pertain
to smaller cities and would indicate unfulfilled gains from further expansion.
However, the analysis is partial because it does not consider other externali-
ties, most of which involve costs, not gains, as cities grow larger. In the follow-
ing Section an overall assessment with policy implications, based on these addi-
tional externalities (individual analysis is too lengthy to present here), is
presented using the general method described in this Section.
IV
OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF MARKET DISTORTIONS AND
POLICY CONCLUSIONS
For cities of a considerably larger size than those considered in the prece-
ding Section, scale economies become negligible with other, generally negative,
externalities predominating. For the externalities studied in this research,
5. See W. Hirsch, THE ECONOMICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1970).
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namely pollution, congestion, and local public finance externalities, the sug-
gestive effects of failure of the market system to internalize these spillovers
are presented in Table II.
The striking results of Table II are that effects of the externalities on city
size are substantial, while the national income costs of the city size effects are
small. The city is increased in population by more than 10 percent, while the
national income cost is only about .6 percent of the income produced in the
city. Hence, externalities not considered by migrants in entering or leaving a
city leads to large cities being too large in general and small cities being too
small. It is difficult to say more than this since differences in meteorological
conditions (for pollution), highway systems (for congestion) and institutional
finance arrangements lead to a range of optimal sizes as well as the fact that
private productivity may vary considerably due to the presence of local advan-
tages such as harbors, nearness to raw materials and the like.
The basic reason for the substantial city population effect is the high elas-
ticity of demand for labor across locations. The production function for many
goods is about the same all over the country, so that a small change in wage
costs will induce large changes in industry location decisions. The reason for
the smallness of national income costs is that, for laborers reallocated, the dif-
ference in their marginal products as between location is a relatively small
percentage of their total marginal product. The specific numbers used and
details of the analytical assumptions could vary a great deal and still not alter
this basic conclusion.
Our organizational concept has been to view the problem of location in
terms of externalities. The analysis broadens the scope for quantitative analy-
sis of policy, but at the same time, externalities remain which were not sub-
TABLE II
SUGGEsIvE EFFECrS OF EXTERNALITIES FOR A CITY OF SIX MILLION PEOPLE
Effect on Popu- National Income Cost of the
Type of Externality lation of the City City Population Effect
Pollution and congestion +500,000 $26 million
Economies of scale Minor for a city Makes small towns too small,
of this size but economies arc exhausted
for larger cities
Local public finance:
Direct effect ($30 million
Additional pollution
and congestion costs +400,000 $30 million
Welfare and unemployment
compensation 1 $15 million
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jected to economic value measurement. In the broadest sense three types of
externalities may be identified:
(1) Environmental externalities, such as pollution and congestion, com-
prise the first type of externalities. The common feature of these
externalities is that they have physical effects;
(2) Government-induced externalities result, inadvertently, from govern-
ment policies such as property taxation, welfare and minimum
wage laws which have important spatial dimensions. In each case
the private locational decision is distorted by the unintended in-
centives created by programs aimed at other problems;
(3) Broader social goals constitute a final group of externalities about
which little has been said here. These include such diverse effects
as changes in the distribution of income, racial or ethnic integra-
tion, the cohesiveness of society, and prevention of breakdown of
the family.
While we have not dealt directly with the third type of externality concerned
with broader social goals, the analysis does substantially refocus the discussion,
narrow the range of uncertainty about policy outcomes, and lead to an im-
proved policy-making capability. Of particular importance, it shows that the
first two types of externality can be dealt with in quantifiable terms. These are
important in their own right for many policies. They can be juxtaposed with
private costs in considering the total quantifiable cost of policies in a compre-
hensive quantitative evaluation. A full evaluation can also consider broader
goals, which can be quantified in non-dollar terms or discussed in qualitative
terms.
Table III illustrates a methodology for evaluating a policy, a program or
an administrative action which involves a choice among locations. The specific
example is for a federal procurement action which might be undertaken in
one of two cities. In the absence of externalities, the expenditure for the pro-
curement will be paid out to factors of production in an amount equal to the
opportunity cost of what the factors could produce elsewhere, giving an ade-
quate measure of the social cost of the procurement. To these private costs
are added externalities which are quantifiable in dollar terms. The total
of government expenditure and externalities gives total costs quantifiable
in dollar terms. This total permits a conclusion as to whether externalities
quantifiable in dollar terms are sufficiently large and act contrary to the com-
parison of government expenditure cost to reverse the rankings of the two lo-
cations. Beyond this, indices of the change in number of people in poverty
and of the amount of ethnic and social integration can be constructed. Finally,
externalities that are purely qualitative can be noted in the Table with very
brief verbal reference to the effects to be expected.
[Vol. 43, No. 2
Page 211: Spring 1979]
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF SOCIAL COSTS OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN Two CITIES
Chicago Tulsa
Government Expenditure
Externalities Quantifiable in Dollar Terms:
Pollution
Congestion
Fiscal Effects
Subtotal
Externalities Quantifiable in Physical Terms:
Poverty
Integration
Non-quantified Externalities:
The use of this type of tableau could raise the level of discussion of
alternatives affecting location, and it could greatly aid those with policy re-
sponsibilities in attempting to arrive at coherent decisions.
Is it desirable to adopt an explicit and logically defensible population dis-
tribution policy? If the answer is yes, as we believe, a first cornerstone of the
population distribution policy could be to eliminate the adverse population
distribution effects of existing institutions and policies. Policies inadvertently
fostering centralization include the method of state and local government fi-
nance, minimum wage policy and the welfare payments system. They all ap-
pear to have large spatial effects that lead to both a greater concentration of
poorer populations in large metropolitan areas and substantially greater
suburbanization within the metropolitan areas, thus producing greater ethnic
and income separation. In addition to the more usual arguments in favor of
the following reforms, the reforms may be called for on grounds of improv-
ing population distribution: eliminating the minimum wage or neutralizing its
locational effects by setting real rather than nominal wages according to re-
gional and city price level variations, and reforming welfare through
nationalizing along the lines of the negative income tax.
The foregoing changes pertain to redesigning policies which have policy
justifications other than their effect on population distribution. Consider
finally the implications of the analysis for measures whose primary purpose is
to influence population distribution. The analysis indicates that only small na-
tional income or cost differences result from substantial alterations of city size.
For instance, if redressing environmental externalities were the only reason
for trying to affect population distribution, the trouble might not be justified.
The other side of this coin is that there might be little cost to positively
pursuing non-economic goals in population distribution, such as reducing ra-
cial separation.
URBAN GROWTH
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Since it is easily attainable, from a cost point of view, to change the loca-
tion of jobs and people to foster the kind of society we want, a second corner-
stone of population distribution policy could be to face squarely troublesome
questions about mixes of people. Do we want more mixing of income and eth-
nic groups, more disadvantaged people in the suburbs, and more advantaged
people in the central cities? Other questions can be raised: Do we want more
of the type of people and values fostered by dispersal and decentralization?
Do we want to try to influence the existence of regionalized cultures and the
geographical dispersion of political power? If the answer to any of these ques-
tions is yes, there remains a fundamental question on which debate will split:
Do we believe public decision making can adequately foster these goals?
A prerequisite would be that policy aims be translated to-the maximum ex-
tent possible into objective norms, providing rules and guidelines to avoid ca-
price in carrying out the will of legislation. Supposing that major aims in pop-
ulation distribution are to foster greater integration of ethnic and income
groups, numerical formulas can be specified indicating contribution of mea-
sures to the goals. As simple possibilities, the formulas could measure the ef-
fect on racial balance and the effects on proportion of families with incomes
under $3,000. The formulas would sum all communities substantially affected
by a policy measure. An increase in the proportion of blacks or browns living
in predominately white communities would be given a positive sign, as would
an increase in proportion of whites living in predominately black or brown
communities. The opposite kinds of changes in racial proportions would be
given negative signs. Analogous procedures would be followed with regard to
proportions of families with incomes under $3,000. A specific formula to indi-
cate contribution of a measure to population distribution objectives would be
the population weighted sum of the signed changes in proportions of non-
whites plus the similarly weighted sum for proportions of families with in-
comes under $3,000.
Two measures might be contemplated. First, the formulas just described
could be used to give points in decisions as to the location of federal expendi-
tures. Second, in revenue sharing the formulas could be used to increase
funds to communities showing progress in racial and economic integration. In
addition to being objective and having the hope of being more effective than
many previous population distribution proposals, these measures have advan-
tages over racial measures such as busing and punitive incentives in that they
are carrot rather than stick inducements, and need not bring backlash. More
attention to measures such as these could lead to a population distribution sig-
nificantly, but not necessarily radically, different from what we now have
contributing to national well being by taking account of societal issues of im-
portance.
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